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Abstract 
The demand for maritime transport has increased with the growing demand for worldwide trade. 
This has led to a major increase in maritime traffic and ship sizes over the last decades, which 
raises the probability of accidents. The methods used in maritime risk assessments today are 
based on old hypotheses that do not include all data available today. The main objective of this 
thesis is to develop numerical models and methods for the analysis of what is considered as 
normal navigation behaviour at sea today and improve the analysis of probability for ship-
bridge allisions.  
The first part of the thesis describes what is considered as normal meeting distance at sea today. 
This information is later used while identifying failure events to ensure that the event behaviour 
was not caused by other ships. These few cases are excluded from the methodology since the 
communication and situational awareness in the situations are not known. However, while 
studying the probability of ship-bridge accidents, it is also important to understand how 
waterway restrictions may affect the probability of ship-ship collisions. Therefore, this thesis 
also includes a study of how the improved knowledge concerning meeting distance could be 
used in a near ship-ship collision identification model. One of the main findings considering 
normal meeting distance is that small and large ships meet each other at a similar distance at 
sea. 
In the second part of the thesis, a methodology is proposed to estimate the probability of ship-
bridge allision. The presented methodology uses Automatic Identification System (AIS) data 
and a ship manoeuvring simulator to simulate and analyse marine traffic with regards to risks 
for accidents, such as ship-bridge allisions. A failure event identification method is also 
presented, which is needed to determine the frequency, duration and behaviour for the accident 
scenarios. The three events that were modelled and simulated in the simulator were: drifting 
ship, sharp turning ship and missing turning point. The probability of the different failure events 
corresponded to previous statistics confirming the AIS-based methodology. This means the 
methods to obtain the probability and duration of the failure events could be utilised in other 
areas. The simulation methodology was confirmed with the probability of grounding in the 
Great Belt VTS area. 
This thesis firstly contributes to a better understanding of the modelling of probability for ship-
bridge allisions. This will support bridge-building engineers who need to take into account 
accidental loads from ship-bridge allision while designing bridges. Secondly, this thesis also 
contributes to a better representation of normal behaviour at sea, which is used both in fairway 
designs and in estimations of ship-ship collisions. 
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The increase in marine traffic density and ship sizes over the last decades has raised the potential 
threat to existing maritime infrastructure. At the same time, the advancement in bridge-building 
engineering has created new opportunities to build larger bridges that span over wider 
waterways. However, building bridges over wide waterways tightens the free sailing width in 
the waterway, which may increase the risk of ship-ship collisions. The increased threat to 
existing bridges and new building of larger bridges demands new methods and models that can 
be used in risk assessments of ship-ship collisions and ship-structure allisions in fairways.  
In this thesis, the accident between ship-structure is differentiated from ship-ship, where the 
former is denoted as allision and the latter as collision. This differentiation separates ship 
striking another ship and ship striking a stationary object. The following subchapters provide 
background and motivation for this research within the fields of the ship-ship collisions and 
ship-structure allisions. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Risk analysis is used to ensure that the bridge design and waterway traffic fulfil the expected 
safety standards. Despite this, 34 major bridge collapses caused by ship-bridge allisions 
occurred from 1960 to 2007, which resulted in the loss of more than 340 lives (AASHTO, 
2009). The worst ship-bridge allision to occur in Sweden is the 1980 Almö bridge accident, in 
which MS Star Clipper had a manoeuvring problem and hit the Almö bridge. Due to fog and 
lack of emergency routines seven cars drove off the broken bridge, and eight people died. The 
risk of ship-bridge allision was not included in the design criteria for the construction of Almö 
bridge. The Eurocode 1 now requires that this risk is included in the design (CEN, 2006). Ship 
allision is one of the most important load cases for the design of these bridges, according to 
Hauge et al. (1998). Bjørndal et al. (2016) makes a similar claim regarding the Bjørnafjord 
crossing in Norway and states that in addition to environmental and service loads that form the 
basis of the strength design of a bridge, the accidental probability of various hazardous events 
and accidental loads must be considered. 
Reliable infrastructure is a key to the economic growth of the last century; the road network has 
expanded vastly all over the globe and involves numerous bridges. However, building bridges 
is expensive; to give two examples, the building costs of the Öresund bridge and the Great Belt 
bridges in the late 1990s were approximately 3 billion Euros each (Great Belt Fixed Link, 2020; 
Öresund Bridge, 2020). The cost of rebuilding one of these bridges, after a ship destroying it in 
a bridge allision, would probably exceed the building cost. Minor accidents, only damaging the 
bridge, might also be costly and in some cases are the repair cost exceeded by the socio-
economic cost of detours and delays. The socio-economic cost estimations are rough and 
seldom published, but to give one example: a lorry hit the Södertälje bridge in 2016; the repair 
cost was estimated to 2 million Euros (DI, 2016), and the socio-economic cost of the accident 
was estimated to 7.5 million Euros (Schmidt, 2016). Another bridge accident that was studied 
from a socio-economic perspective was the collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minnesota (US), 
where structural failures caused the bridge to collapse in 2007. The socio-economic cost was 
estimated at $165 million, and the building cost was estimated at $234 million (Haugen, 2008). 
These examples illustrate that the cost of allisions could be severe. Despite this, Hauge et al. 
(1998) claim that excessive conservatism should be avoided, in connection to protecting from 
ship-bridge allisions, since extra protections have severe cost impacts in bridge-building. 
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Both collision and allision accidents also have a major impact on the environment. In both types 
of accidents, there is a risk of oil leakage and/or pollution from the cargo damaging the local 
marine environment. The worst collision, from an environmental perspective, dates back to 
1979 when SS Atlantic Empress and the Aegean Captain collided and almost 3 million tons of 
oil leaked. A more recent example is the January 2018 Sanchi and CF Crystal collision in the 
East China Sea 6, where Sanshi sank with 136,000 tonnes of crude oil (IHS Fairplay, 2020). 
Furthermore, repairs and new building also have a negative impact on the environment. For 
example, the building process and material for a 225-metre cargo ship have a Global Warming 
Potential, GWP, of 47.9 million kg CO2-equivalents (Quang et al., 2020). Du et al. (2014) 
studied five different bridge concepts for a 338-metre long bridge in a Life Cycle Analysis 
perspective, and all alternatives had an estimated GWP of roughly 6 million kg CO2-
equivalents.  
The research presented in this thesis was initiated by the Norwegian E39 project, which aims 
to make a continuous coastal highway route between Kristiansand and Trondheim in Norway. 
Today, this route includes seven fjord crossings with ferries, and with a continuous connection, 
the Norwegian Public Road Administration (NPRA) aims to reduce the travelling time by more 
than 50 percent (NPRA, 2020). The crossing of Bjørnafjorden is one of the most challenging 
parts of the project. The fjord crossing is just over 5 km wide, and the fjord has a depth of over 
500 metres. Initially, three different crossing solutions were investigated; a tension leg platform 
(TLP) bridge, a submerged floating tunnel (SFT) and a floating bridge (Bjøndal et al., 2016). 
Analysing the risk of ship-structure allisions for these concepts required new and innovative 
models and methods. Adding a bridge will shrink the fairway width; therefore, it is also 
important to understand how this affects the probability of ship-ship collisions. 
Even though many researchers have already covered this field, there are still improvements to 
be made (Pedersen, 1995; Friis-Hansen et al., 2008; Goerlandt and Kujala, 2011; van Dorp and 
Merrick, 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2012). This is a broad research field, including both 
probability and consequence assessments for multiple types of accidents. Research concerning 
the consequence side of ship-structure allision has improved significantly over the last decades 
(Sha et al., 2019). However, limited research has focused on the probability of allisions and 
determining which ship to include in the consequence analysis. Projects such as the fjord 
crossings in the Norwegian E39 project require a better understanding of the probability of ship-
bridge collisions and what ship to use in extensive structural assessments. 
Risk assessment methods for collisions and allisions in shipping build on the theory that Fujii 
and Shiobara (1971), Fujii and Tanaka (1971) and Macduff (1974) pioneered and established 
in the early 1970s. At that time, ship movements were often estimated based on records of radar 
images. The introduction of Automatic Identification System (AIS) in the early 2000s and 
availability of AIS recordings have since then, according to Svanberg et al. (2019), resulted in 
new possibilities to enhance the accuracy in maritime risk assessments. The research in this 
thesis utilises the AIS data and the increased computer capacity in new innovative 
methodologies to estimate the probability of maritime accidents. 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to safer ship navigation in fairways by the 
development of numerical models and methods for analysis of what is considered as normal 
navigation behaviour at sea today, and analysis of the probability of ship-bridge allisions. Three 
research questions are addressed in the thesis: 
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• How do ships navigate at sea today? The framework for risk assessment was introduced 
50 years ago; is ship behaviour similar today? 
• How can failure events of ships sailing in fairways be identified and quantified with 
respect to frequency and duration? 
• How does the probability and duration of failure events influence the probability of 
allision and the design criterion for maritime structures? 
Based on the main objective of the thesis, and by considering the three research questions, four 
goals for the research in the thesis were formulated. 
(i) Propose a new methodology for defining the ship domain based on current local 
characteristics.  
(ii) Develop methods that can identify and quantify failure events for ships navigating 
in fairways. 
(iii) Propose a methodology that uses failure events and AIS data in a ship manoeuvre 
simulator to estimate design loads on maritime infrastructure. 
(iv) Apart from estimation of the design load on maritime infrastructure, determine 
whether the simulation methodology also enables new and innovative possibilities 
to analyse risk mitigation options. 
1.3 Limitations 
The revisit to the ship domain presented in Paper I is limited to a study of the normal behaviour 
at sea today. The method to obtain the ship domain does not evaluate whether or not it is safe 
to use this domain; instead, it resembles the navigation behaviour at sea today. 
The simulations presented in the thesis are restricted to the simulation of only one ship at a 
time, i.e., two ships are not simulated at the same time. This is since the number of possible 
actions a captain can make in situations with event failures on multiple ships are too many and 
too complex to address in a fast-time manoeuvring simulator. This is one important 
differentiation and limitation compared to other methods where a ship colliding after avoiding 
another ship is a separate accident event.  
The risk of ship-bridge allisions is evaluated with the simulation methodology proposed in 
Paper III. However, the consequence analysis of allisions is limited to the estimation of the 
kinetic energy just prior to the allision. The consequence, such as structural integrity and 
damaged caused to the ship or damaged bridge after an allision event, is completely outside the 
scope of this thesis.  
The methodology for estimation of the probability of ship-bridge allision is verified with the 
probability of ship grounding. It would be preferable, from the model-developing perspective, 
to verify the model with allision accidents, but there have not been enough allision events for 
comparison.  
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents an overview of existing methods 
for allision and collision risk assessments. Chapter 3 presents the methods used in the thesis, 
together with their assumptions. Chapter 4 presents a brief summary of the results presented in 
the three appended papers. The conclusions are presented in Chapter 5, followed by suggestions 






2 Review of studies on ship allisions and collisions 
The chapter presents an overview of methods used in estimations of probability for ship-bridge 
allisions, ship simulation methods and ship-ship collisions. Common for the included methods 
in this chapter is that they focus primarily on the probability of occurrence and not the 
consequence in the risk analysis. Most models in this field that focus on probability are based 
on the equation that Fujii and Shiobara (1971) and Macduff (1974) proposed in Eq. (2.1): 
 𝑁𝐶𝑜𝑙 = 𝑁 × 𝑃𝐶  (2.1) 
where NCol in is the number of accidents, N is the number of candidates and PC is the causation 
probability, which is composed of environmental factors, mechanical failures and human error. 
Chapter 2.1 presents an overview of methods defining the ship domain and uses of it. Chapter 
2.2 presents an overview of simulation methods. Building codes are central in civil engineering 
and bridge-building. Thus, Chapter 2.3 presents the two major building codes and an extended 
method to obtain the probability of allision. 
2.1 Methods using the ship domain concept 
The term “ship domain” was first defined by Goodwin (1975) as the effective area around a 
ship which a navigator would like to keep free with respect to other ships and stationary objects. 
Within the same field of research, Fujii and Tanaka (1971) had introduced the term “effective 
domain” four years earlier while modelling the traffic capacity. They defined their domain as 
the effective domain around a ship into which other ships avoid entering. Pietrzykowski and 
Uriasz (2009) investigated different types of ship domains. They identified that it is difficult to 
differentiate if the ship domain is the area navigators want to keep clear, like the definition by 
Goodwin, or if it is the area that is left clear, like the domain by Fujii and Tanaka. It may also 
be differentiated into it being a difference between how much space the navigators want to have 
versus how much the navigators get. This field of research is 50 years old, and new technology 
like the AIS may have altered the way navigators operate. The early research on ship domains 
used radar observations, and the introduction of AIS enables new types of studies. In this 
subchapter, known gaps in the ship domain research are highlighted and a few different use 
cases are presented. 
Gucma and Marcjan (2012) used AIS data to study if the type of ship and encounter type 
affected the ship domain in the Gulf of Pomerania. They concluded that the type of ship had no 
effect on the shape of the domain, and only minor differences could be observed with different 
types. Hansen et al. (2013) investigated the passing distance between ships in the Great Belt 
and the Drogden Channel. The distance to target ships was measured in ship length, and it was 
determined that the domain had the same shape and size as the effective domain by Fujii and 
Tanaka (1971). In the study by Hansen et al. (2013), it was assumed that the ship domain should 
be measured in the unit ship length; however, the study did not investigate if this was the actual 
case. According to Szlapczynski and Szlapczynska (2017), the ship domain has been defined 
by many others since it was introduced. The ship domain has also been used in different 
contexts ever since it was introduced; three of these could be summarised into traffic capacity, 
risk assessments and active risk mitigation.  
The title of Fujii and Tanaka’s (1971) article was “Traffic Capacity”, which also summarises 
one area of research where the ship domain is used. In this research area, the ship domain is 
used to define the maximum traffic volume that can safely pass a specific width, sailing under 
bridges or within TSS’s (e.g. Frandsen et al., 1991; Jensen et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016). 
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Another context where researchers have used the ship domain is in collision risk analysis. 
Goerlandt and Kujala (2014) compared the fuzzy logic model by Qu et al. (2011), blind 
navigation with a Dynamic Maritime Traffic Simulator (DMTS) without using any ship domain 
(Goerlandt and Kujala, 2011) and counting the number of ship domain violations with the 
method by Weng et al. (2012). They concluded that only modest claims could be made 
regarding the reliability of the risk estimate in terms of probability accuracy. Goerlandt and 
Kujala (2014) finally concluded that there is a need for a more valid method, with less 
uncertainty, that links ship-ship encounters to collision risk. Zhang et al. (2015) introduced the 
Vessel Conflict Ranking Operator (VCRO) model as another approach to identify near-miss 
situations. This model was updated with the Minimum Distance to Collision (MDTC) model 
and ship domain in Zhang et al. (2016, 2017). The MDTC is a model by Montewka et al. (2012) 
that identifies collision candidates depending on the ships’ intersection angle and lengths. The 
MDTC model improves the collision diameter that Preben (1995) introduced while taking the 
ships’ manoeuvrability into account when assessing situations. 
The ship domain concept is also used in real-time manoeuvring, both for alert systems and 
autonomic shipping (Rong et al., 2015; Im and Luong, 2019; Zhang and Meng, 2019; Huang et 
al., 2020; Du et al., 2020). However, applying the ship domain in real-time collision avoidance 
may be controversial, since the ship domain is often a result of successful collision avoidance, 
as pointed out by Montewka et al. (2020). This is supported by Rawson and Brito (2020), who 
studied collisions and used the ship domain by Wang (2010) to study the number of encounters. 
In their study, they concluded that the statistical relationship between areas with a high number 
of encounters and number of collisions is weak. The research by Shen et al. (2019) tried to omit 
this problem and used a ship domain by Smierzchalski (2005), that takes the ship length and 
speed into account. This may solve some problems, but as Hansen et al. (2013) pointed out, 
navigators want to have a different amount of “free water” depending on the geography, a factor 
not accounted for in the ship domain by Smierzchalski (2005). 
To summarise, since the ship domain is used in different types of applications, there is a need 
for different types of ship domains. For assessments of the probability of ship-ship collision 
and to study the effect of a shrinking water width, it is important to have a ship domain that 
represents how ships interact today. Gucma and Marcjan (2012) concluded that it is important 
to investigate how the ship domain relates to the ship size, whereas Hansen et al. (2013) 
concluded that ship domain by Fujii and Tanaka (1971) was correct in one location but not in 
another. Hansen et al. (2013) argued that it is thus important to investigate ship domains in 
multiple locations and types of water. There seems to be a need for a new method that revisits 
the ship domain, utilizing the AIS data, to obtain location-specific ship domains. 
2.2 Simulation models used in maritime risk assessment 
Computer-based simulation models have been used in the maritime field for decades. One 
example is Källström and Ramzan (1985), who used a combination of simulation models and 
model tests for the installation of the world’s first commercial TLP. Nowadays, there are 
various types of maritime simulation models and software for different purposes. The models 
included in this chapter are an overview of three types of models: The Maritime Transportation 
System (MTS) model, autonomic ship simulators and ship manoeuvre simulators. 
The MTS model handles the ships’ temporospatial positions in a time domain-simulation, and 
the ships are moved according to their assumed speed and course. In this type of simulator, the 
hydrodynamic forces are not calculated, which makes it relatively fast and simple to use. This 
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type of simulator was used by Ulusçu et al. (2009), who studied the risk of accident in the Strait 
of Istanbul. The model includes multiple parameters concerning the traffic and its prerequisites. 
In Ulusçu et al. (2009), these were obtained from the VTS, local operators’ websites and 
hydrological institute. They split the Strait of Istanbul into 21 slices and analysed the risk of 
collision, grounding, ramming, sinking and fire/explosion. The risk profile in Ulusçu et al. 
(2009) was obtained using 25 repetitions of one-year’s traffic; they concluded that the 
repetitions were good to capture rare events. Van Dorp and Merrick (2011) proposed using the 
MTS model for risk assessments in coastal areas. In this model, the traffic was simulated on 
routes, obtained from AIS data, and the ship failures and errors in the model were simulated 
based on expert opinions. The MTS model uses the HAZMAT (1997) wind drifting model for 
drifting events. Van Dorp and Merrick (2011) concluded that their model is good for 
comparison studies, but due to simplifications, they concentrated less on the absolute values. 
Goerlandt and Kujala (2011) continued this research and implemented the DMTS model. This 
simulator is also based on AIS data, but it addresses the meeting situations differently than the 
others. Goerlandt and Kujala (2011) used a Monte Carlo method to estimate the risk of collision 
and grounding in the Gulf of Finland. In this research the failure modelling was based on 
causation factors. Connected to this work is the research by Hänninen and Kujala (2010, 2012) 
who improved the research on causation factors using Bayesian networks. They concluded that 
the concept of causation probability is vague and there is a need for a more general probabilistic 
model. Rasmusen et al. (2012) used the ShipRisk software to quantify the risk to ship traffic in 
the Fehmarnbelt fixed link project. The ShipRisk software seems to be a mixture of the models 
by Pedersen (1995) and an MTS simulator by Ulusçu et al. (2009). In Rasmusen et al. (2012), 
the probability of human error, loss of propulsion and steering machine failure were analysed. 
Another type of simulator is those aiming to enable autonomous navigation and voyage 
planning. These types of simulators are a bit more complex than the MTS models, since they 
include hydrodynamic forces in two dimensions. Xue et al. (2011) used a three-degrees-of-
freedom (DOF) simulator, a potential field method and automatic collision avoidance for 
autonomous route finding. This simulator simulated the movements in surge, sway and yaw 
(see Figure 1). Xue et al. (2011) highlighted that there were some difficulties in implementing 
the potential field method without getting oscillations in tight situations. Despite this limitation, 
they concluded that the methodology appears to be well-suited for automatic route finding, 
which also handles collision avoidance. However, there still is much work required to integrate 
the knowledge of experienced mariners into the system before it resembles human navigation. 
Johansen et al. (2016) continued this research and added wind and currents to the model. By 
simulating different situations, they illustrated that their method could be tuned to acceptable 
control behaviours for a wide range of cases. Shen et al. (2019) continued this research and 
implemented a deep Q-learning model to comprehend automatic collision avoidance for 
multiple ships. In addition to the proposed algorithm model tests were also included in this 
research, running three self-propelled ships in a basin, to validate the mathematical model. Shen 
et al. (2019) concluded that the model tests and mathematical model gave similar results and 
recommended continuing with only the mathematical models. However, they also concluded 




Figure 1. Illustration of a ship’s six degrees of freedom. 
Ship manoeuvring simulators are often used in extensive training, as manoeuvring in confined 
waters and ports is a complex issue. These types of simulators focus on accurate hydrodynamic 
modelling in six DOF (see Figure 1) to ensure the correct ship behaviour during training. 
Although the main use of manoeuvring simulators is training, it is an important tool while 
assessing risks in ports and fairways. Manoeuvring simulations are often used to decide 
operational limits, e.g. how many tugs a birthing ship requires in various wind conditions (Chen 
et al., 2018). Schaub et al. (2019) proved that the RAPID method, included in the SAMMON 
software (Baldauf and Benedict, 2018), had clear benefits for lecturing and training while 
improving ship handling. Weber et al. (2019) used the web version of Seaman, Seaman 
OnlineTM (SSPA, 2020), and concluded that the simulator supports students in understanding 
the complexity of ship behaviours in different conditions. There are multiple providers of ship 
manoeuvring simulators; examples include full mission simulators from Transas, Kongsberg 
and Rheinmetall connected in the European Maritime Simulator Network during the Sea Traffic 
Management project (Poschmann and Wilko, 2017). 
To summarise, the different types of simulation models and software have different pros and 
cons. In both the MTS and DMTS models, there are several types of failures/errors 
implemented, but the details on how these behaviours are implemented, their frequency and 
their durations are not clear. The MTS and DMTS models are fast to run, but they are not based 
on hydrodynamic force calculations, which limits the models’ accuracy in scenarios with 
alterations of the ship’s path. The simulation models used in autonomous navigation are based 
on more advanced hydrodynamic models, which enables better possibilities to alter scenarios, 
etc. However, the models in this category lacked implementation of human error and technical 
failures. Regarding the full mission simulators, Chen et al. (2018) highlight that a drawback 
with them is the cost since it is often very expensive to run simulations in full mission. Another 
drawback of these simulators is that they are time-consuming; the manoeuvring needs to occur 
in real-time, making it difficult to test thousands or millions of cases. In this thesis, a new 
methodology was developed, using the strength of these existing models to simulate real-world 
ship traffic, including location-specific failure events. 
2.3 Bridge building codes and calculation of probability of allision 
Two major associations, the Eurocode (CEN, 2006) and the American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation (AASHTO, 2009), define building codes applied in bridge-
building. Both include equations for assessing the accidental load from ship-bridge allisions. 
The Eurocode influences the building codes of European countries with respect to the 
construction of bridges and proposes Eq. (2.2) for estimation of the probability that a ship will 
demolish a bridge (CEN, 2006). 
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 𝑃𝑓(𝑇)  =  𝑛 × 𝑃𝐶 × 𝑇(1 − 𝑝𝑎) ∫  𝑃{𝐹𝑑𝑦𝑛(𝑥) > 𝑅}𝑑𝑥
∞
0
   (2.2)  
where Pf(T) is the probability of bridge collapse during the reference period T, n is the traffic 
intensity, PC is the failure probability, pa is a factor of human intervention, x is the position of 
where the failure can occur and is integrated over the area in front of the bridge, Fdyn is the 
impact force of the allision, and R is the resistance of the structure. AASHTO (2009) proposes 
a similar equation in Eq. (2.3).  
 𝐴𝐹 =  𝑁 × 𝑃𝐴 × 𝑃𝐺 × 𝑃𝐶 × 𝑃𝐹   (2.3) 
where AF is equal to Pf(T), N is the number of vessels classified in different categories, PA is 
the probability of vessel aberrancy, PG is the geometric probability, PC is the probability of 
collapse due to a bridge allision, and PF is an adjustment factor to compensate for potential 
mitigations. These codes are primarily developed and applied for inland waterways with ship 
traffic in narrow waterways. One problem with these codes is that there is limited guidance in 
how to use them for bridges spanning over open waters. To obtain the probability of allision in 
these types of waters, the model by Pedersen (1995) and IWRAP software (Engberg, 2017; 
Friis-Hansen et al., 2008) is often used.  
Pedersen (1995) studied the risk of grounding, allision and collision. Four accident categories 
were proposed to obtain the number of candidates, and the use of fault tree methodology was 
proposed to investigate the causation factor. The four accident categories could be summarised 
into:  
1. Ships that follow the intended route but with a too-large offset from the centre of the 
route. 
2. Ships that fail to turn at a given turning point. 
3. Ships that make evasive actions due to other ships and thereafter colliding. 
4. Other types of accidents, e.g. off-course ships and drifting ships.  
Chen et al. (2019) reviewed models used in maritime risk assessments and concluded that 
Pedersen’s model has been the basis of many risk assessment methods since it was first 
presented. One model that to a large extent builds upon Pedersen’s equations is the IWRAP 
software (Friis-Hansen et al., 2008). This is a software from the International Association of 
Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) that is encouraged by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for quantitative risk assessments (IMO, 2010). 
IWRAP can be used to assess multiple types of risks, including collisions, grounding and 
allisions. The software has been used in multiple studies, e.g. in Cucunotta et al. (2017), who 
used IWRAP to compare the effect of using Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) versus not using 
VTS, and Ylitalo (2010), who studied the risk of accidents in the Gulf of Finland with IWRAP. 
Both concluded that the software yielded a similar result compared to the accident statistics. 
However, Ylitalo (2010) also concluded that the result was sensitive to the causation 
parameters, how the user defined the routes and the parameter mean time between checks.  
In summary, the building codes ensure that the accidental loads are included in the design 
criteria of bridges. For more advanced constructions, the equations by Pedersen (1995) are often 
used. However, the codes are not developed for offshore bridges, and Pedersen’s equations are 
sensitive to the input parameters. Further, none of them include AIS data, which, according to 







The methods described in this chapter aim to mitigate the identified shortcomings of the ship 
domain, ship-ship collision assessments and the probability assessment of ship-bridge allisions. 
Papers I and II focus on the ship domain and ship-ship collision, whereas Paper III focuses on 
ship-bridge allision. The main results and conclusions from the papers are presented in Chapter 
4. Figure 2 shows the connections between the papers.  
 
Figure 2. Connections between Papers I to III appended to the thesis. 
AIS data contains information on how ships have travelled, and by comparing all the ships that 
pass an area, it is possible to distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviour. Information 
on both the normal and the abnormal behaviour is an important input to the three papers, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. The following subchapter describes the benefits of AIS data and how the 
data has been utilised in the research presented in the thesis and appended papers.  
As described in the previous chapter, there are several areas of applications for the ship domain, 
and the methodology presented in Chapter 3.2 revisits the definition for the ship domain in the 
aspect of what distances are used at sea today. The ship domain is primarily used in ship-ship 
collision analysis, and the methodology in Chapter 3.3 describes how the revisited ship domain 
is implemented in the VCRO model.  
The ship domain was revisited in Paper I, which enabled the study on ship-ship collision in 
Paper II. Paper III focuses on single-ship manoeuvring in simulations connected to ship-bridge 
allisions, where the ship is experiencing some type of failure event. It was discovered in 
literature studies that there was not enough research available to implement simulations of 
failures in situations where multiple ships were present at the same time. For this reason, all 
situations with intrusions of the ship domain (defined in Paper I) by a secondary ship were 
excluded from the analysis in Paper III. 
  
Paper I Paper II Paper III
Automatic Identification System (AIS)







Applied in a risk model
Ship domain




3.1 The use of AIS data 
The introduction and availability of AIS recordings have, according to Svanberg et al. (2019), 
resulted in new possibilities to enhance the accuracy in maritime risk assessments. The 
foundation for the research in the included papers is to a large extent based on AIS data. Since 
its introduction in 2002, ships larger than 300 gross tonnes must have an AIS transponder and 
transmit messages. AIS messages are separated into two types: position report and metadata 
message (Raymond, 2019). Every ship issues a position report every 2 to 10 seconds at sea, 
depending on the ship’s speed and turning rate, and a metadata message every 6 minutes (ITU-
R, 2014).  
One limitation of AIS data is that it only includes temporospatial related data, and not 
information regarding the machinery status onboard or the verbal communication between 
ships’ bridges, etc. Most of this data is recorded; however, it is stored locally onboard the ship 
in the voyage data recorder. The benefit of AIS data is that it always broadcasts to whoever is 
listening. This enables enhanced possibilities to study ship traffic over an extensive area and 
during a long period. This is a big difference compared to when Fujii and Tanaka (1971) studied 
the ship domain by radar images.  
In this thesis, the position message has been used as both “single points” and “trajectories”. The 
latter is obtained by combining multiple points into lines, and this is exemplified in Figure 3, 
where twelve AIS position reports are combined into 3 lines. The lines represent AIS messages 
with similar speed over ground (SOG) and course over ground (COG). In the figure, the red 
and blue lines have the same COG, but the SOG differs, and the green line to the right represents 
messages with a different COG and SOG. This method of combining messages has several 
benefits: the amount of data stored in the database is reduced; missing data points might not 
cause inconsistencies; a similar method is presented in Zhao and Shi (2019) and Wei et al. 
(2020).  
 
Figure 3. Illustration of how AIS position reports are converted to trajectories. The blue 
line represents AIS messages with COG: 300° and SOG: 7.5 knots, the red line 
represents AIS messages with COG: 300° and SOG: 7.1 knots, and the green line 
represents AIS messages with COG: 280° and SOG: 7.5 knots. 
In all three papers, trajectories were used to capture the general traffic in the respective case 
study. The method in Paper I, to define the ship domain, and the method in Paper III, to identify 
events, both firstly use the trajectories to find candidates and secondly position data to do the 
analysis. In Paper I the trajectories are interpolated into points every second, and in Paper III, 
the actual positions are utilised. In Paper II, the interpolated points from Paper I are used to 
calculate the VCRO value and raw AIS data was used as input to the IWRAP software.  
The AIS data used in this research are continuously streamed from various sources and stored 
as NMEA encoded text (Raymond, 2019) together with a timestamp in text files. The AIS 
trajectories used in the analysis are stored in an in-house Postgres database with the spatial 
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extension PostGIS. The code for selecting data from the database is written in SQL, whereas 
the code for analysing the data and generating graphics is written in the programming language 
Python. 
3.2 Revisiting the ship domain 
The main scope of Paper I is to revisit the ship domain concept by Fujii and Tanaka (1971) and 
investigate how different parameters affect the meeting distance. A key concept in this context 
is the temporospatial distance between ships, i.e. the distance between them with the same 
timestamps. A ship that passes another ship’s path se eral hours or days later will not affect the 




Figure 4. Flowchart of the methodology used in Paper I to determine the ship domain. 
In this research, the distance between the ships’ centre is investigated, similar to Hansen et al. 
(2013). So, the first step of the methodology is to relocate the position to the ship centre from 
the position onboard where the AIS transmitter is located. The next steps in the methodology 
are to collect all the trajectories at the decided location and interpolate these trajectories into 
positions every second. Other research, such as Zhang and Meng (2019), interpolated the pairs 
every 30 seconds and Rawson et al. (2014) interpolated their pairs every 10 seconds. After this 
operation, records without any other ship closer than 5,000 metres are excluded from the 
analysis.  
The remaining temporospatial pairs were then grouped by bearing and sorted by distance. The 
closest 5 percent of all meetings were considered to intrude the ship domain, and the rest of the 
meetings were considered to occur outside of the ship domain. The closest 5 percent was also 
utilised as a criterion for Gucma and Marcjan (2012) and Cheng et al. (2014). Pietrzykowski 
and Magaj (2016) used a 7.5 percent limit, and Hansen et al. (2013) used both a 5 percent and 
7.5 percent limit. The maximum search distance, which is closely connected to this criterion, 
was studied in Paper I. In Paper II, the ship domain from Paper I was applied in an existing risk 
model, the VCRO model by Zhang et al. (2016). In Paper III, the domain was used to identify 
ships that were unaffected by the presence of other ships while gathering failure event statistics.  
3.3 Ship-ship collision 
The purpose of Paper II is to investigate how the revisited ship domain influenced an existing 
model. The VCRO model by Zhang et al. (2016) was selected. The VCRO model was selected 
since near-misses are important for ship-ship collision assessments, and the equations for the 
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ship domain was well described. In a second step, the result from the VCRO study was 
compared against the result from the IWRAP software to obtain the accident probability.  
A VCRO value is a measurement developed to highlight situations that might be a near-miss. 
The value can be calculated when two ships are close to each other with Eq. (3.1) (Zhang et al., 
2016, 2017):  
 𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑂 =  
𝑘
𝑥−𝑙θ
𝑦 ∑ 𝑚𝑛 sin(𝑛 × 𝑧)
𝑛=17
𝑛=1   (3.1) 
in which the constant k is estimated by fitting the minimum error in Eq. (3.3); x is the distance 
between the ships in nautical miles (nm), lθ is the length of the ship domain (nm) along the 
bearing to the second ship, calculated in accordance with Eq. (3.2), y is the relative speed of the 
ships (knots), z is the phase which is the difference in heading between the ships (degrees), 
which is positive when ships are approaching each other and negative when they are moving 
apart, mn represent the ships’ manoeuvrability and can be gathered from a Fourier series 
expansion (Zhang et al., 2016) as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Coefficients (mn) after the Fourier series expansion  
according to Zhang et al. (2016). 
m1 0.3443 m5 0.04933 m9 0.01556 m13 0.001044 m17 -0.01129 
m2 -0.005811 m6 -0.01347 m10 -0.008126 m14 -0.005202   
m3 -0.06834 m7 -0.002292 m11 -0.0009892 m15 0.01056   
m4 0.01177 m8 0.01041 m12 0.007698 m16 0.001526   
The coefficients in the Fourier series are based on crossing situations in the Gulf of Finland and 
were assumed to be valid in Paper II.  










  (3.2)  
In Eq. (3.2), S and R are the lengths of the half axes of the elliptic ship domain. Zhang et al. 
(2016) use the Fujii and Tanaka (1971) ellipse, where S = 1.6×L (L is the ship length), and R = 
4×L, where both L and x are expressed in nautical miles. The bearing, θ, was counted positively 
in clockwise fashion from the ships’ own heading to the azimuth of the target ship. 
Zhang et al. (2017) highlight that one issue with the model by Zhang et al. (2016) is that the 
ships in the meeting will get different VCRO values depending on the ship lengths. The risk 
interpretation of the situation may therefore differ onboard the two ships. Zhang et al. (2017) 
implement a ship domain by Wang et al. (2009) and obtain a mean VCRO value for the 
situation. In Paper II, the location-specific ship domain was used instead of the ship domain by 
Wang et al. (2009), in addition to the one from Fujii and Tanaka (1971).  
Min (|𝐸 (𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑂(𝑥1𝑛𝑚+𝑙𝜃)) − 100| + |𝐸(𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑂(𝑥6𝑛𝑚)) − 5|) (3.3) 
Eq. (3.3) is a combination of Eqs. (24) and (25) by Zhang et al. (2016). It defines that all 
situations, with a ship at a distance of one nm plus the length of the ship domain, as potentially 
dangerous and should have a high VCRO value (which is set to 100). All situations with a ship 
passing at a distance of six nm, are considered safe and should have a low VCRO value (which 
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is set to 5). To obtain this equilibrium, the VCRO value is calculated for all situations in a 
location with a range of k values. This range varies between the different locations; in the case 
study area outside Gothenburg, k values between 35 and 70 were used to find the minimum 
error, this is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. VCRO values for a range of k values for SDAIS and SDFujii at Gothenburg. 
With separated lθ and k values for the different ship domains, it was possible to count the number 
of meetings that had a maximum VCRO value above 100 for the respective ship domains. A 
VCRO value above 100 does not state that the ships are at risk of collision. However, it was 
used in the study to compare the identified candidates, in potential near-miss situations, 
captured with the two ship domains.  
As mentioned earlier, the VCRO model aims to highlight situations that might be a near-miss; 
however, by default, it does not estimate the probability of ship-ship collision. For this purpose, 
the IWRAP software was used in Paper II. The output from the IWRAP model is given in terms 
of incidents per year. However, the number of crossing collision candidates can be calculated 
as the collision/year divided by the causation factor for crossing candidates. In Paper II, the 
default value of 1.3×10-4 was used (Friis-Hansen et al., 2008). 
3.4 Ship-bridge allision 
The methodology to obtain the probability of ship-bridge allisions proposed in Paper III consists 
of several parts. The general idea in the methodology is to obtain local event statistics and 
simulate these events in a ship manoeuvring simulator to get the probability of ship-bridge 
allisions. All events that are likely to occur in one year are simulated thousands or millions of 
times. In these simulations, the input parameters are generated with a Monte Carlo simulation 
method. Simulation of a single ship’s  oyage takes approximately two seconds on an Intel Core 
i7-2600 3.4 GHz processor with 16 GB RAM and 64 Bit architecture. By utilizing multiple 
cores of the processor (and multiple processors), millions of simulations could be computed in 
hours. 
A major difference between the proposed methodology, compared to existing methodologies 
based on Eqs (2.1) to (2.3), is that no equation estimates the number of allisions. The number 
of simulations is calculated by equations, but the number of allisions is given by the simulations. 
Another major difference is that the methodology includes methods to obtain location-specific 
failure events, in regard to both duration and frequency. Thirdly, the methodology enables new 
possibilities to study risk mitigation options. A fourth differentiation from previous research is 
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that only a single ship is simulated in each simulation. This is because the event statistics are 
gathered from single-ship situations, and it is challenging to model all human decisions that 
could be made in an autopilot logic.  
Apart from the probability of allision, this methodology also enables estimations of the design 
energy the structure needs to withstand. This is possible since the kinetic energy just prior to 
the allision is captured for all simulated allisions. Several scripts were used to run and control 
the simulations, compiling the result and analysing it. Figure 6 is an illustration aiming to show 
how the different key concepts in Paper III are connected. 
 
Figure 6. A schematic of the simulation methodology proposed in Paper III. 
A central part of the presented methodology is the bridge design criteria. According to Johansen 
and Askeland (2019), there are different ways to interpret these criteria, and they proposed the 
use of an FN-curve to better represent both the probability and the consequence. However, to 
keep it simple, a risk criterion with a threshold of 110-3 was used in Paper III. It is defined as 
the bridge should withstand and survive all allisions that have the probability to occur once 
every 1,000 years.  
3.4.1 Event failure statistics 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the methodology depends on AIS data to identify three events; 
drifting ship, sharp turning ship and missing turning point. In short, the methods to identify the 
three events is carried out in two steps. First is an automatic filter with specified conditions 
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concerning the ship speed, course, etc. applied on all AIS trajectories to obtain event candidates. 
The original AIS points of the event candidates are manually investigated in a second step.  
The ship domain from Paper I was used to exclude ships affected by other ships from the event 
statistics. Ships affected by other ships are excluded from statistics due to the lack of knowledge 
concerning if and how the ship was affected by the presence of the other ship. The ship domain 
from Paper I was chosen since it represents the normal behaviour in the area. Excluding events 
of ships affected by other ships is an important distinction from the method proposed by 
Pedersen (1995; 2020), where allision caused by one ship making evasive manoeuvres due to 
the presence of another ship is an accident category. Multiple ships and collisions between them 
are also included in the MTS and DMTS simulators.  
Similar event categories were presented by Rasmussen et al. (2012), and the methodology to 
obtain the frequency of the event missing turning point is similar to the method used by 
Rasmussen et al. (2012); (they denote the event “human error”). However, the methodology 
for obtaining drifting ship and sharp turning ship differs. Instead of using AIS data to obtain 
the probability, they used VTS records to obtain the probability (although they denote the events 
as “loss of propulsion” respecti e “steering machine failure”).  
In total, 153 events were identified in the two areas included in Paper III, the Great Belt VTS 
and the TSS Bornholmsgat. The frequency for the event drifting ship and the event sharp 
turning ship was calculated by dividing the number of events with the number of sailing hours. 
The event missing turning point frequency was calculated by dividing the number of events 
with the number of ships making the turn. These frequencies, together with the data from 
Rasmussen et al. (2012), are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. Summary of event frequencies, including the frequencies 
in a case study presented in Rasmussen et al. (2012). 
Event category Great Belt VTS TSS Bornholmsgat Rasmussen et al. (2012)  
Drifting ship 0.6510-4/hour 0.9110-4/hour 0.610-4/hour 
Sharp turning ship 0.03810-4/hour 0.09210-4/hour 0.110-4/hour 
Missing turning point 1.5510-4/turn 2.1010-4/turn 2.510-4/hour 
 
The duration of the identified events was measured between the timestamp of the position report 
prior to the event being initiated and the timestamp of the position report when the ship was 
under control, either en route again or safely anchored. In case of drifting ship and sharp turning 
ship, the measured time was fitted to a lognormal distribution, and the duration of the event 




Table 3. Statistical distributions and their parameters for duration of events  
(time in hours). The parameters correspond to standard deviation, σ, 
 location, ι, scale, λ, and mean value, μ. 
Event category Great Belt VTS TSS Bornholmsgat Rasmussen et al. (2012) 
Drifting ship Lognormal 
σ = 0.71 
ι = 0.021 
 λ = 0.69 
Lognormal 
σ = 0.87  
ι = 0.1 
λ = 0.97 
Weibull 
σ = 0.5 
λ = 0.605 
Sharp turning ship Lognormal: σ = 1.2; ι = 0.06 λ = 0.54 n/a 
Missing turning point Normal 
μ = 0.064 
σ = 0.015 
Normal 
μ = 0.19 
σ = 0.047 
Less than 0.33 
 
3.4.2 Setting up the simulations and determining the number of years to simulate 
The number of simulations for drifting ship (i=1) and sharp turning ship (i=2) is estimated with 
Eq. (3.4), and the number of simulations for missing turning ship (i=3) is simulated with Eq. 
(3.5). 




𝑗=1    (3.4) 




𝑗=1    (3.5) 
where NSim,i is the number of simulations for event i, Pft,i is the event probability per hour for 
the event under study, NCat,j,k is the estimated number of ships per year for ship type j on a route 
k in the area, tN,j,k is the average time ship type j sails on the route k, and Yr is the number of 
repetitions of one-year’s traffic the simulation should represent. PCSA,i is the probability that a 
ship misses a turn, and NT,j,k is the number of turns the ship j makes on its route k. 
Most of the simulations will not result in a ship-bridge allision; however, for those simulations 
that ended with an allision, the allision energy was calculated according to Eq. (3.6), where M 
is the ship’s displacement, v the ship speed and E is the allision energy. The formula is 
simplistic; it does not include detailed energy distribution between the ship and bridge, which 
could be studied by external dynamics simulations (see for example Yu et al., 2016).  
 𝐸 = 𝑀 × 𝑣2 2⁄    (3.6) 
The methodology uses the Monte Carlo simulation method to generate the input parameters, 
and it is important that the results are reproducible. Hence, by defining the random seed, a 
simulation could be reproduced, and it also ensures that new combinations of random variables 
are generated (Harris et al., 2020). The number of simulations needed in the set was determined 
by a criterion defined in this study stating that the difference in allision energy between 
simulation sets with the same input should not differ more than five percent. If the result of two 
sets, with the same distribution input, differs more than five percent, the number of repetitions 




The simulator runs were defined in three categories divided into ten simulation sets.  
(i) Investigation of the influence from random seeds in the generation of random 
variables (3 simulation sets, defined as 1A, 1B and 1C). 
(ii) A sensitivity study of the parameters (5 simulation sets) defined as: 
2. Increased drifting probability and duration. 
3. Increased probability for sharp turning ships. 
4A. Increased probability and duration for missing turning point. 
4B. Increased probability for missing turning point. 
4C. Increased duration for missing turning point. 
(iii) Demonstration of examples of risk mitigation options (2 simulation sets); 
5. 12 knots speed restriction in the Great Belt VTS area. 
6. New layout of the routes, making a longer straight sailing approach to the 
bridge. 
The number of simulations to run in each set is calculated according to Eq. (3.4) and (3.5). 
Initially, Yr was set to 10,000 times, and simulations of sets 1A, 1B and 1C were performed. 
The result of these simulation is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Results from simulation sets 1A, 1B and 1C with Yr = 10,000. 








1,000-year expected allision 
energy (MJ) 
1A 395,770 5,165 59 2,308 1,220 
1B 395,770 5,214 67 2,315 1,620 
1C 395,770 5,065 56 1,967 1,403 
 
The expected allision energy differed more than 30 percent depending on the random seed, 
highlighted in Table 4. This variation is primarily caused by the random parameters speed and 
lateral offset. In simulation set 1B, there were a few more cases of large ships that had 
unfavourable combinations of high speeds and a big lateral offset compared to 1A and 1C. Yr 
was then raised to 100,000 times, and the variation between the random seed became less than 











This chapter presents a summary of the appended Papers I to III. It highlights the main 
achievements and presents a selection of important results from the papers. 
4.1 Summary of Paper I – A revisit of the definition of the ship domain 
The aim of Paper I is to define which parameters today influence the ship domain. This 
investigation clarifies the definition of the ship domain and proposes a new method to quantify 
the size and shape of the domain by using historical ship-ship encounters. The main finding of 
the paper is that the size of the ship domain is not dependent on the length of the ship, since 
small and large ships keep a similar meeting distance. The remainder of this subchapter 
highlights some of the key findings of Paper I. 
Ship size 
In Paper I, 36 locations all around the Swedish coast and over 600,000 encounters were 
analysed. Based on this study, it was concluded that the ship domain has the shape of an ellipse, 
which is similar to previous research (Fujii and Tanaka, 1971; Hansen et al., 2013; 
Pietrzykowski and Magaj, 2016). The lengths of the half axis in the ellipse were found to be 
0.9 nm and 0.45 nm. These are defined in nm, which is a contradiction to Fujii and Tanaka 
(1971) and Hansen et al. (2013), who defined the ship domain in the unit ship length. This is 
illustrated in Figure 7, where the ships (both the ship under study (own ship) and the other ship 
(target ship)) were separated into four length categories.  
 
Figure 7. Illustration of the ship domain with different sizes of ships, 
gathered in the Kattegat sea between Sweden and Denmark. 
The ship domain defined by Fujii and Tanaka (1971) increased linearly with the length of the 
ship. This means their ship domain of a 260 m long vessel would be 3.25 times larger than the 
ship domain of an 80 m long ship. As illustrated in Figure 7, this is not the case; the ship domain 
does not increase with the length of the ship. 
Geography 
It was found in Paper I that one parameter that affects the ship domain is the location; in narrow 
waterways, the ships are forced to sail closer to each other. In Figure 8 this is exemplified with 
two locations in open sea: Kattegat – In the T-route and Bornholmsgat – Within the TSS and 
two locations with restricted depth; and Öresund – East of Ven and Öresund – Drogden channel. 
Since the length of the ship did not affect the length of the ship domain, ships of all sizes are 
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used for each location. The ship domain in the two locations with open sea are similar, and the 
ones with restricted waters are narrower.  
 
Figure 8. The ship domain in different locations. 
The location Öresund – East of Ven has rather dense ferry traffic crossing the main lane, and 
the ship domain is more circular shaped compared to the more-elliptic-shaped in the Drogden 
channel. This connects to another finding of Paper I, and it is important to understand that the 
ship domain could be observed both from the own ship and the target ship, defined as the 
spectator location.  
The spectator location 
The spectator view of the shape of the ship domain is different in overtaking situations (elliptic) 
compared to crossing situation (more circular). However, Figure 9 illustrates that there is one 
ship domain per ship in an intersection, one for the own ship and one for the target ship. The 
action of the target ship affects the ship domain the spectator will see while investigating the 
own ship. In Figure 9, the own ship and four different target ships illustrate how their ship 
domain affect the resulting ship domain (i.e. the ship domain the spectator will see, while 
investigating the own ship) in the overtaking and crossing situation.  
 
Figure 9. The ship domain in different intersection types. 
In the overtaking situation (on the left-hand side in Figure 9), the resulting ship domain has the 
same size as the own ship’s ship domain. However, in the crossing situation, both the own ship 
and target ships’ ship domain affects the resulting ship domain (illustrated on the right-hand 
side in Figure 9). 
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The maximum distance to target location 
A fourth finding in Paper I is connected to the definition of the ship domain, where the 5 percent 
closest target ship defines the domain. Even if the paper did not investigate the sensitivity of 
this definition in detail, the parameter search distance was investigated. Four different “search 
lengths” were used in a sensitivity study in Paper I, and the result of this study is illustrated in 
Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Different maximum distance to target ship. 
The figure illustrates that the ship domain increases while the maximum distance to target ship 
increases. This increase is exemplified with the following example: 5,000-metres distance 
yields a total of 100 meetings in one sector, and 10,000 metres yields a total of 200 meetings in 
the same sector. The length of the ship domain, with a 5,000-metres search radius, will get the 
distance of the 5th meeting since the ship domain is defined by the closest 5 percent. In the 
example with a 10,000-metres search radius, the ship domain will instead be defined by the 10th 
meeting distance, with the 5 percent limit. However, the “ .  percent closest” distance in the 
10,000-metres example is the same as the “  percent closest” distance in the 5,000-metres 
example. This means the cut-off limit and search radius are connected. 
The bulge between 270° and 315° for the 7,000- and 10,000-metres search distance in Figure 
10 illustrates the effect when a too large area is included. To limit the amount of unrelated data 
that clutter the result, it is recommended to use a 5,000-metres search radius. 
Concluding remarks 
The main finding of Paper I is that according to AIS data, ships tend to keep a similar distance 
between each other regardless of the ship size. When the ship domain was introduced by Fujii 
and Tanka (1971), the size was measured in ship length. However, small and large ships tend 
to meet at a similar distance. They try to keep almost 1 nm in front of them and a 0.5 nm a side 
free from other ships. This distance is valid in waters with unrestricted depth, and in areas with 
more restricted depth, the ships pass each other at a much closer distance. Note that the proposed 
ship domain does not include any considerations for the ship’s manoeuvrability or whether it is 
safe to use this ship domain. The findings from Paper I, regarding the size of the ship domain, 




4.2 Summary of Paper II – A comparison of two definitions of ship domain for 
analysing near ship-ship collisions 
The purpose of Paper II is to investigate how the revisited ship domain from Paper I influence 
existing risk models. This is performed by upgrading the ship domain, from Fujii and Tanaka 
(1971), to that proposed in Paper I, in the VCRO model (Zhang et al., 2016). The VCRO is a 
temporospatial risk model, which estimates the danger in real-time, but it does not estimate the 
probability for ship-ship collision. To get the probability of collision, the IWRAP software was 
used (Engberg, 2017). The result, in terms of the number of identified collision candidates for 
the case study, is presented in Table 5. 
Comparison of results from the VCRO model and the IWRAP software 
Table 5 illustrates that the ship domain from Paper I and the ship domain by Fujii and Tanaka 
(1971) yield a similar number of meetings with high VCRO values. Using the location-specific 
ship domain solves the issue, highlighted by Zhang et al. (2017), that ships of different sizes 
obtain different VCRO values in the same situation. The ship domain from Paper I identifies 
more candidates with high VCRO values in the Gothenburg and Baltic Sea compared to the 
ship domain by Fujii and Tanaka (1971). The opposite is true in the Anholt location. The VCRO 
model, with the ship domain based on AIS data from Paper I, classified more overtaking-like 
meetings with an increased risk compared to when the ship domain by Fujii and Tanaka (1971) 
was used. 
Table 5. Number of collision candidates. 
Location IWRAP collision candidates 
Meetings with VCRO values above 100 
AIS - Ship domain Fujii - Ship domain 
Gothenburg 70 10,139 8,784 
Anholt 205 18,898 24,729 
Baltic Sea 120 10,811 8,532 
 
The result from the study also shows that the number of collision candidates differs roughly, 
with a factor 100 between the IWRAP model and the VCRO models. This highlights that the 
VCRO model captures more situations that could have been a collision candidate situation. This 
illustrates that the two models have different purposes: IWRAP is designed to calculate the 
probability of collision, and the VCRO model is designed to find near-miss situations. The 
VCRO model includes the temporospatial distance between the ships, which enables a real-
time assessment of the situation, and IWRAP only includes the spatial distance, which is used 
for probability analysis.  
Concluding remarks 
The main finding of Paper II is the VCRO model and the IWRAP software have different pros 
and cons. The IWRAP model does not include the timestamp from the positions while assessing 
the probability of collisions. For this reason, the IWRAP model cannot determine if two ships 
have collided or not. However, IWRAP is designed to use a more extensive dataset to calculate 
the probability of collision based on many ship meetings. In contrast, the VCRO model is 
designed to find near-misses between two ships, although it cannot be used to estimate the 
probability of collision in an area. In short, since the two models have different strengths, they 
should be used for different purposes.  
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4.3 Summary of Paper III – A method for risk analysis of ship allisions with 
stationary infrastructure 
The main objective of Paper III is to improve the methodology for estimating the probability of 
allision. Paper III introduces a new methodology which uses AIS data and a ship manoeuvring 
simulator to calculate the probabilities for grounding and allision in coastal waters. The 
methodology is reliant on the event identification methods presented in Chapter 3.4. The main 
conclusion from Paper III is that the methodology shows a good correlation with the grounding 
statistics and could be used to estimate the risk of allision. This chapter introduces the main 
results from Paper III. 
The Monte Carlo simulation method described in Chapter 3.4 was used to carry out a large 
number of runs in the Seaman simulator, including parameter sensitivity analysis. As described 
in Paper III and Chapter 3.4.2, ten different simulation sets were simulated; the results of these 
sets are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Results from all simulation sets with Yr = 100,000;  
number of allision accidents caused by D = drifting ship,  
ST = sharp turning ship, MTP = missing turning point. 




Number of allisions 




allision energy (MJ) 
1A 3,959,282 50,258 710 (376, 85, 249) 3,221 1,667 
1B 3,959,282 51,198 722 (385, 97, 240) 4,634 1,601 
1C 3,959,282 51,206 730 (395, 87, 248) 2,708 1,605 
2 4,221,089 65,516 985 (651, 85, 249) 3,221 1,667 
3 3,994,525 54,268 800 (376, 175, 249) 3,221 1,667 
4A 5,169,542 1,020,580 27,954 (376, 85, 27,493) 4,822 4,268 
4B 5,169,542 60,662 777 (376, 85, 316) 3,221 1,880 
4C 3,959,282 748,053 20,606 (376, 85, 20,145) 5,054 4,179 
5 3,959,282 32,003 436 (347, 89, 0) 1,030 12 
6 3,962,135 50,255 484 (402, 82, 0) 2,258 22 
 
Reproducibility and probability of grounding 
The simulation set 1A, 1B and 1C, which uses the same statistics (the failure event frequencies 
and duration from the Great Belt VTS area), except the random seed, yields a similar result. 
The minor difference in the result is expected due to the Monte Carlo simulation. These sets 
prove that the result of the Monte Carlo simulation is reproducible. 
The result of simulation sets 1 (A, B and C) also shows that the probability of grounding is 0.51 
per year. Since the average number of groundings is 50,887, and the simulations represent one 
year 100,000 times. A probability of grounding of 0.51 corresponds very well with the accident 
statistics from the area since five groundings were reported during a ten-year period (IHS 




Sensitivity of the event duration and probability 
The result of sensitivity assessment in sets 2, 3 and 4 shows that the methodology is most 
sensitive to the statistics for the event missing turning point. In set 2, both the probability and 
duration of drifting ship were increased, using the statistics from the TSS Bornholmsgat. This 
led to a 30 percent increase in the number of groundings, but this did not affect the allision 
energy. A similar result is also found in simulation set 3, where the sharp turning ship 
probability was increased by 50 percent, although the increase in the number of groundings was 
only a few percentages.  
The simulation set with increased probability and duration of the event missing turning point 
4A differs from the previous sets. The set was for this reason divided into 4B ‒ increased 
probability and 4C ‒ increased duration. The increase of probability increased the number of 
groundings with 20 percent and the allision energy with 12 percent. However, the increase of 
duration (on average from 0.064 hours to 0.19 hours) in set 4C had a major effect of the number 
of groundings, increased with 1,048 percent, and the allision energy, increased with 250 
percent. This has not been studied or highlighted by similar studies within the same research 
area (e.g. Goerlandt and Kujala, 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2012; van Dorp and Merrick, 2011). 
Another way to analyse the result is presented in Figure 11, where the allision energy from set 
1A is compared with set 4C.  
 
Figure 11. A log-log diagram presenting the probability of allision energy for the 
simulation sets 1A and 4C (with increased missing turning point duration). 
Johansen and Askeland (2019) suggested using an FN-curve as design criteria; this curve has 
probability and fatalities on the diagram axis. Figure 11 does not contain the number of 
fatalities, but in future research, the allision energy could be translated to damages to the bridge. 





The two mitigations, reduction of maximum allowed ship speed and change of navigation path, 
are examples that illustrate how this methodology could be utilised. As illustrated by simulation 
sets 5 and 6, they both reduced the expected allision energy approximately 99 percent. It should 
be noted that the suggested mitigation actions have not been confirmed as realistic measures to 
be enforced in the area. However, with the methodology presented in Paper III, it is shown that 
they are worth investigating further. 
Figure 11 also shows that the allisions with the highest kinetic energy are caused by ships that 
miss a turning point, which justifies that this event is more sensitive to an increase of probability 
and duration compared to the other events. It also explains why the mitigation actions, which 
removed all allisions caused by the event missing turning point, were successful in reducing the 
allision energy. 
The methodology presented in Paper III can be applied either in the planning phase of a new 
bridge over a waterway or in the assessment of marine traffic situations near existing bridges 
where the marine traffic may have changed since they were designed and built. The 
methodology is not limited to ship-bridge allisions; it can also be used to assess the probability 
of allisions with other infrastructure offshore, or other marine accidents such as ship 
groundings. 
Concluding remarks 
The Great Belt VTS area was used in Paper III to verify that the methodology could predict the 
probability of ship groundings. The methodology included three methods that identified and 
quantified failure events in terms of frequency and durations. The frequency of these events 
differs from area to area. However, the frequencies in the Great Belt VTS area were similar to 
what Rasmussen et al. (2012) reported. After simulating the ship traffic from one year 100,000 
times, the number of groundings corresponded well with the accident statistics from the past 
ten years. It was concluded that the presented methodology can be used to simulate and analyse 
traffic situation schemes in coastal waterways to calculate the probability that a ship accident 
will occur. The sensitivity study in the methodology highlights that the duration of the event 
missing turning point is the most sensitive parameter. 
One problem with the existing framework for allision risk assessment is that the probability and 
consequence of the event are often treated separately. The methodology proposed in Paper III 
reduces this problem. Even though the methodology focuses on the probability, it includes a 
conservative calculation of the allision energy, and all parameters from the ship needed for 








The objective of this thesis was to contribute to a safer ship navigation in fairways through the 
development of numerical models and methods for analysis of what is considered as normal 
navigation behaviour at sea today and by an analysis of the probability of ship-bridge allisions.  
One of the aims of this thesis is to propose a new methodology for defining the ship domain 
based on current local characteristics. The ship domain was introduced in the early 1970s, and 
since then, the resemblance of the domain has often been based on the length of the ship. The 
normal behaviour at sea today was studied in Paper I. With the new definition of the ship 
domain, based on AIS data, it was concluded that ships tend to keep a similar distance between 
each other regardless of the ship size. However, as also confirmed by others, the geography 
affects how closely ships meet. In open water, the distance between ships is larger compared to 
channels where the meeting distance is smaller. 
To improve the analysis of ship-bridge allisions, three types of methods were developed to 
identify drifting ship, sharp turning ship and missing turning point in Paper III. The events were 
quantified with respect to frequency and duration. These methods are based on AIS data, which 
enables the possibility to obtain local event failure statistics wherever there is AIS data 
available. In this paper, the simulation of failure events was verified with real-world examples 
to ensure that the simulation replicated the failure events recorded with AIS data. 
Paper III proposes a methodology that uses these failure events and AIS data in a ship 
manoeuvring simulator to estimate the design load on maritime infrastructure. This 
methodology was applied in the Great Belt VTS area, where one-year traffic was simulated 
100,000 times in a Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation methodology was verified with the 
probability of grounding; it proposed a grounding probability of 0.51 groundings per year, and 
the reality showed 5 groundings in 10 years. The allision energy was calculated for the allision 
cases, and from these cases, the 1,000-years design energy was defined, which is used in the 
bridge design criteria. 
Based on the result in Paper III, it is concluded that increased probability and duration of the 
failure events increase the probability of allision. The probability and, especially, the duration 
of missing turning point had a major impact on the design criteria. However, in the case study, 
it was also concluded that the probability of the events drifting ship and sharp turning ship did 
not affect the design criteria. 
Apart from estimation of the design load on maritime infrastructure, the simulation 
methodology also enables new possibilities to analyse risk mitigation options. In the case study, 
two different mitigation options were analysed, a reduction of ship speed and a change in traffic 
pattern. Both options reduced the allision energy by 99 percent. 
In summary, this thesis firstly contributes to a better representation of normal behaviour at sea, 
which is used both in fairway designs and estimations of ship-ship collisions. Secondly, this 
thesis also contributes to a better understanding of the modelling of probability for ship-bridge 
allisions. This will support bridge-building engineers who need to consider accidental loads 







6 Future work 
Several areas of research and improvements of methodologies together with possible solutions 
have been identified for future work. In addition, knowledge gaps and possible development 
paths were established, and some thoughts on future studies are presented below. 
Enhancements of the methods connected to the ship domain 
The methodology of obtaining the ship domain could be extended to include variables to tune 
the ship domain for different events. One example is a parameter to alter the ship domain 
depending on the fairway width. Other parameters where it is recommended to study the 
extremity and maybe include as a parameter could be: 
 
• Slow versus fast ships. 
• Good versus bad weather. 
• Daylight versus darkness. 
Extending the methodology to include such specific parameters could be interesting in specific 
cases. To give one example: if the ship domain for fast-going ship is different from the ship 
domain for other ships, it is necessary to use the correct ship domain while assessing the 
probability of ship-ship collision for fast-going ships.  
Enhancements of the methods connected to the ship-ship collision 
In further studies regarding ship-ship collision analysis, it is recommended to connect the ship 
domain research with the probability of event failure. Such study reveals the connection 
between the location-specific size of ship domain, the navigational layout and the probability 
of ship-ship collision. The first step in such study will determine the minimum distance when 
it is not possible to avoid an accident. Ship-ship collision caused by a failure event that occurs 
at a greater distance than this could be avoided by actions of the ship without failure. However, 
to establish this a more advanced study needs to determine a possible set of actions and reaction 
times. This enhancement could either be done by extending the VCRO model to include the 
probability of a failure event or extend the simulation methodology in Paper III to include 
multiple ships and collisions. 
Enhancements and extensions of the methods connected to the ship-bridge allisions 
Connected to the methodology in Paper III, it is recommended to study failure events in more 
areas and to improve the methods for event identification. When event statistics are studied in 
enough areas, it is possible to estimate the statistics for areas that will get a new traffic pattern, 
e.g. when a bridge have been built or new regulations are put at force. Closely linked to this 
enhancement, it is also recommended to identify more types of events, and the following are a 
few examples: 
• Ships that turn at the wrong location. 
• Ships that set a faulty course at a waypoint. 
In the methodology presented in Paper III, there is no reduction in kinetic energy for glancing 
allisions or for allision against the mast/deckhouse. In future research, it is recommended to 
connect the methodology in Paper III with a methodology for structural integrity analysis. This 
extension of the methodology will improve the consequence assessment, making this a better 
tool for risk assessments. Two recent examples of structural integrity analysis are the 
simulations of ship deckhouse allision loads on bridge girders by Sha and Amdahl (2019) and 
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the research analysis in both ABAQUS and LS-DYNA for crushing ships with bulbous bow by 
Storheim et al. (2016). Both describe detailed methodologies for the consequences of an 
allision. Extending the methodology with methods used by Sha and Amdahl (2019) or Storheim 
et al. (2016) would improve the consequence analysis to the methodology. With an improved 
consequence assessment, the methodology can determine what loads the structure should be 
able to withstand. 
Another path for extending the methodology is to include simulations of multiple ships and add 
both collisions and allisions caused by avoiding another ship as failure modes. This path 
requires incorporating research with artificial intelligence like Shen et al. (2019), in order for 
the autopilot to make decisions in complex meeting situations. However, the main “issue” with 
that type of research today is that it does not include failure events. The algorithms are designed 
to behave optimally and avoid all collisions; they do not include mechanical failures or human 
error today. Further, the artificial intelligence does not represent all actions that we as humans 
could make. Before multiple ships are included in the methodology, there is a need to include 
a wider range of possible actions that better represent humans’ decisions. 
There are other areas where the probability of allision is important, for example, ship-
windfarms and ship-quays. The methodology developed in Paper III can easily be adapted to 
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